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I. INTRODUCTION
Before Crawford, Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court's strongest proponent
of a vigorous right to confrontation, lamented that
the following scene can be played out in an American courtroom ... : A
father ... or a mother ... is sentenced to prison for sexual abuse on the basis
of testimony by a child the parent has not seen or spoken to for many months;
and the guilty verdict is rendered without giving the parent so much as the
opportunity to sit in the presence of the child, and to ask, personally or
through counsel, "it is really not true, is it, that I-your father (or mother)
whom you see before you-did these terrible things?"'
After Crawford, face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser is
the constitutionally normative mode of presentation for testimonial evidence.
Surely an anguished and accused parent now has the right to ask Justice
Scalia's fateful question.
Yet, eight years into the Crawford revolution, courts routinely hold that it
does not violate the Confrontation Clause for counsel to waive a parent's right
to question an accusing child without so much as discussing the matter with the
accused parent.2 Why? Because counsel, not client, has the authority to decide
* Associate Professor, Tulane Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the generous research
support of Tulane University and the remarkable assistance of Professor Jancy Hoeffel.
1. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). While Justice Scalia was
complaining about procedures that barred face-to-face confrontation in child witness cases, his complaint
speaks directly to the dignitary values served by the Confrontation Clause in any criminal case. See id. For
further discussion of this issue, see infra Part H.A.
2. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 257 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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whether to confront and cross-examine government witnesses.' When a
defendant claims that his counsel deprived him of the right to confrontation,
most courts ignore the substantive confrontation claim and reframe the issue as
one of ineffective assistance of counsel.4 If counsel was effective, the
defendant has no confrontation claim.
At a Symposium devoted to two Sixth Amendment rights-confrontation
and counsel-it seems particularly appropriate to explore this peculiar and
perplexing result. If confrontation is essential to a constitutionally valid
criminal trial, how can defense counsel waive the confrontation right without
the accused's consent? Does the right to counsel truly extinguish a defendant's
right to demand confrontation?
In this Essay, I explain how the artificial fundamental rights doctrine has
ceded confrontation control to counsel. Then, I consider and critique the
jurisprudence addressing defendant claims about confrontation rights that were
waived or forfeited by defense counsel. Along the way, I offer some
observations about the implications of ceding confrontation control to counsel.
I conclude by arguing that the right to confrontation best serves its purposes
when defendants control the exercise of the right.
II. CONSIDERING CONFRONTATION
A. Confrontation: Purpose and Practice
The Confrontation Clause is a "bedrock procedural guarantee" of the
United States' criminal justice system.5 The Confrontation Clause serves at
least three separate functions.
First, the Confrontation Clause "ensure[s] the reliability of the evidence
offered against a criminal defendant." 6 It is, thus, a partial hedge against empty
government accusations and erroneous convictions. The Clause achieves this
goal by "subjecting [the government's evidence] to rigorous testing in the
context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact."7 The physical
confrontation between witness and accused and the process of adversary inquiry
submit the prosecution's proof to "the greatest legal engine ever invented for
the discovery of truth."8
This reliability function is closely intertwined with a second function of
the Confrontation Clause: the preservation of an adversary system of criminal
procedure. As the Court recently explained, "the only indicium of
3. See also discussion infra Part II.B.
4. See discussion infra note 62.
5. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
6. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990).
7. Id.
8. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
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reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution
actually prescribes: confrontation."9 After all, the "principal evil at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal
procedure, and particularly its use of exparte examinations as evidence against
the accused."10 Thus, the Confrontation Clause "reflects ajudgment, not only
about the desirability of reliable evidence .. .but about how reliability can best
be determined"; as a result, the Confrontation Clause "commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by
testing in the crucible of cross-examination.""
Finally, the Confrontation Clause serves a legitimizing function, both
assuring the public of fair process norms and enforcing a systemic commitment
to dignity and fair play for the accused. As the Court has explained,
"confrontation serves ends related both to appearances and to reality."' 2 The
Confrontation Clause imposes a specific constitutional mandate: "criminal trials
of human beings should look human to do 'justice,' and should treat the
defendant-even an alleged child molester-as an equal, dignified participant
in the proceedings against him."13 The Confrontation Clause thereby honors
"something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation
between accused and accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a criminal
prosecution."'14 It also provides the accused "the intrinsic benefit of the chance
to respond" to the witness "with a snort of indignation, a glare, laughter, a cry
of dismay, a curse, tears, or stony silence." 5 Thus, even if the face-to-face
confrontation does not change the witness's testimony, "[t]he opportunity to be
seen and heard by one's accusers nevertheless is of value-intrinsic value-to
the accused" and to the public. 16
The Supreme Court has established three basic rules that govern the
exercise of the "bedrock" confrontation right. First, the right to confrontation
includes the right to waive confrontation. 17 Second, the confrontation right is
lost unless the defendant contemporaneously exercises the right or preserves an
objection to the offending testimony or evidence. 8 Third, the exercise of the
confrontation right may be regulated by a state's imposition of rules requiring a
9. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69.
10. Id at 50.
11. Id at 61.
12. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988).
13. Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value ofFace-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L. REv. 863,903
(1988) (footnote omitted). Professor Massaro's article offers excellent insight into the dignitary values
associated with confrontation. See id.
14. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)).
15. Massaro, supra note 13, at 906.
16. Id Massaro suggests that this "might be called the 'shame on you' value of confrontation." Id.
17. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 314 n.3 (2009); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S.
442, 451-53 (1912).
18. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 327.
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pretrial demand for confrontation; failure to comply with the pretrial invocation
rules results in a loss of the confrontation right.19
These rules create procedural requirements for the exercise of the
confrontation right. They do not establish any procedural requirements for the
waiver of the confrontation right nor do they explain why counsel can waive a
defendant's confrontation right without the defendant's consent. The answers
to these questions lie not in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence but in the
Supreme Court's fundamental rights doctrine.
B. Confrontation as a Non-Fundamental Right
The Supreme Court has divided constitutional criminal procedure rights
into two categories: fundamental rights and non-fundamental rights.20 The
categorization of a right as fundamental or tactical (non-fundamental)
determines whether client or counsel has authority to waive that right and what
standard of review applies to an appellate or post-conviction claim about
counsel's exercise of the right.
The Supreme Court has described fundamental rights as "basic" rights, so
personal to the defendant that the defendant alone can waive them.2 ' In
contrast, non-fundamental rights are those strategic or "tactical" constitutional
rights related to the "conduct of the trial."2 2 The Supreme Court has clearly
stated that the rights to "plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in [one's] own behalf,
or take an appeal" are fundamental.23 Conversely, the Court has held that the
19. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2011). This last "rule" rests upon the
Court's recent dicta strongly approving of these pretrial notice-and-demand rules. See Melendez-Diaz, 557
U.S. at 327 ("There is no conceivable reason why [the defendant] cannot . .. be compelled to exercise his
Confrontation Clause rights before trial."); Bulicoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2718 (noting that notice-and-demand
statutes lawfully "permit the defendant to assert (or forfeit by silence) his Confrontation Clause right after
receiving notice of the prosecution's intent" to rely on testimonial hearsay (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S.
at 326)); see also State v. Latumer, 218 P.3d 23, 30 (Kan. 2009) (finding that Melendez-Diaz dicta supports
the constitutionality of K.S.A. § 22-3437(3), which indicates a failure to timely demand confrontation
"constitute[s] a waiver of any objections" to use of testimonial hearsay (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-3437(3) (West 2008))). As I have noted elsewhere, I strongly disagree about the constitutionality of
requiring the defendant to make a pretrial invocation of the confrontation right. See Pamela R. Metzger,
Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 481 n.20 (2006). However, an assumption that those rules
are constitutional is an essential part of the analysis that condones attorney control over the confrontation right.
20. I take issue with the assertion that any constitutional right is non-fundamental. However, an
argument about the validity of the fundamental rights doctrine is well beyond the scope of this Essay. See
Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant's Right to Control the Case, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 1147 (2010), for an autonomy-based critique of the fundamental rights doctrine.
21. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114-15 (2000).
22. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988). For a critique of the fundamental/non-fundamental
rights divide as confusing and unclear, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 3 CRIM. PROC. § 11.6(a), (b) (3d ed.
2011).
23. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); see also Hill, 528 U.S. at 114-15; Taylor, 484 U.S. at
417-18 & n.24. LaFave, King, Israel, and Kerr offer a slightly more expansive list, suggesting that
[t]he Supreme Court has stated, in dictum or holding, that it is for the defendant to decide whether
to ... plead guilty or take action tantamount to entering a guilty plea; waive the right to jury trial;
waive his right to be present at trial; testify on his own behalf; or forego an appeal.
2012] CONFRONTATION CONTROL 87
choice of appellate claims, 24 the invocation or waiver of trial objections, 25 and
decisions about "what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of
evidence" 26 involve the exercise of non-fundamental rights.27
28The waiver of a fundamental right requires the defendant's consent.
This consent "not only must be voluntary but must be [a] knowing, intelligent
act[] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences." 29 Thus, counsel cannot waive a defendant's fundamental rights
until counsel has "consult[ed] with the defendant and obtain[ed the
defendant's] consent to the recommended course of action." 30
In contrast, counsel has exclusive control over the exercise of non-
fundamental rights.3' The general rule is quite simple: "waiver [of a non-
fundamental right] may be effected by action of counsel" without the
defendant's knowledge or consent. 32  "Absent a demonstration of
ineffectiveness, counsel's word on such [non-fundamental rights] is the last."33
Claims that counsel erred by waiving a non-fundamental right are generally
viewed as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.34
What does the fundamental rights doctrine mean for confrontation? The
Supreme Court has long held that an attorney may not waive a defendant's right
to confrontation if the waiver renders the subsequent trial the functional
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 22, § 11.6(a) (footnotes omitted). Lower federal courts and state courts have
suggested a more expansive set of rights as to which a defendant may exercise control. Id. These include
the waiver of the right to attend important pretrial proceedings; the waiver of the constitutional
right to a speedy trial; the refusal (by a competent defendant) to enter an insanity plea; and the
decision to withhold defendant's sole defense at the guilt phase of a capital case and use it solely in
the penalty phase.
Id.
24. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 751.
25. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965).
26. Hill, 528 U.S. at 114-15 (citation omitted).
27. See id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)); see also Taylor, 484 U.S. at
417-18 (applying the ineffective assistance of counsel standard to counsel's waiver ofthe right to call defense
witnesses because right to compulsory process is not a fundamental right).
28. Hill, 528 U.S. at 114-15.
29. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
30. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004). Some rights, like the right to plead guilty, are validly
waived upon compliance with a particular set of procedural requisites. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
242-44 (1969). There are no similar prescriptive formulas for the valid waiver of other fundamental rights.
See infra text accompanying note 117.
31. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 417-18.
32. Hill, 528 U.S. at 114.
33. Id. at 115. The rule privileging counsel's decision over non-fundamental rights assumes, sub
silentio, that counsel actively waived the defendant's rights rather than carelessly or negligently forfeiting
those rights. See infra Part M.A. In turn, this assumption means that trial records never evince any evidence
of waiver as opposed to forfeiture. See infra Part H.A. When the lawyer's conduct is later challenged, courts
invoke the general rule of deference to an attorney's "decisions," and the record's silence on this matter
greatly reduces the defendant's likelihood of success. As I point out infra Part I.A, there is little justification
for the initial assumption that confrontation was waived rather than forfeited.
34. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 22, § 11.6(a).
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equivalent of a guilty plea.35 In Brookhart v. Janis, counsel agreed to a "prima
facie" trial at which counsel stipulated to the submission of the government's
case.36 On appeal, the Court reversed the conviction, holding that Brookhart's
fundamental rights had been violated because his attorney's confrontation
waiver had deprived the trial proceedings of their adversary character.37
Although the Court has never addressed lesser waivers of the right to confront,
subsequent decisions demonstrate that Brookhart's holding is limited to
confrontation waivers that are the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.
Otherwise, the Court views confrontation as a non-fundamental right that may
be exercised or waived at counsel's discretion.
The Court has offered three justifications for permitting counsel to control
confrontation and other non-fundamental rights. First, the Court has argued
that the need for efficiency at trial means that "the lawyer has-and must
have-full authority to manage the conduct of the trial."40 "To hold that every
instance of waiver requires the personal consent of the client himself or herself
would be impractical.""' According to this logic, "[g]iving the attorney control
of trial management matters is a practical necessity," as the "adversary process
could not function effectively if every tactical decision required client
approval."4 2
Second, the Court has suggested that deference to attorney choices is
essential to the "fairness" of the trial process.43 According to this reasoning,
lawyers-not defendants-are best positioned to make "correct" judgments
about the strategic exercise or waiver of confrontation and other trial rights."
"Many of the rights of an accused, including constitutional rights, are such that
only trained experts can comprehend their full significance, and an explanation
to any but the most sophisticated client would be futile.""5  Thus, the very
justification for the right to counsel-that "presentation of a criminal defense
35. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966); see also Nixon, 543 U.S. at 189 (explaining that
Brookhart presented a violation of the defendant's fundamental rights because counsel agreed to a
.'truncated' proceeding, shorn of the need ... [to establish guilt] 'beyond a reasonable doubt"' (citation
omitted) (quoting Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 6)). Nixon constitutes an exception, of sorts, to this general rule.
See Nixon, 543 U.S. at 188-89. However, Nixon presents procedurally different facts and appears to be
confined to the unique circumstances of a two-phase capital trial in which the defendant declines to assist
counsel in making strategic decisions and counsel concedes guilt in an effort to win a sentence of life. See id
at 191-92.
36. See Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 5-6.
37. See id. at 7-8. Any exception to the Brookhart rule arises in the unique context of a two-phase
capital trial. See Nixon, 543 U.S. at 186.
38. See Nixon, 543 U.S. at 189-92.
39. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 327 (2009).
40. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114-15 (2000) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18
(1988)).
41. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 250 (2008).
42. Id. at 249 (second quote quoting Taylor, 484 U.S. at 417-18).
43. See id
44. See Hashimoto, supra note 20, at 1148.
45. Gonzalez, 553 U.S. at 249 (citing and quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DEFENSE
FUNCTION 4-5.2 Commentary, at 202 (3d ed. 1993)).
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can be a mystifying process even for well-informed laypersons"-is used to
justify ceding control to counsel.46 Because "[t]hese matters can be difficult to
explain to a [client,] to require in all instances that they be approved by the
client could risk compromising the efficiencies and fairness that the trial
process is designed to promote."47
Finally, the Court has suggested that agency theory also justifies ceding
control to attorneys. As the Court explained in Faretta, "when a defendant
chooses to have a lawyer manage and present his case, law and tradition may
allocate to the counsel the power to make binding decisions of trial strategy in
many areas."48 This allocation of authority is onlyjustified "by the defendant's
consent, at the outset, to accept counsel as his representative." 49 However, as
the Fourth Circuit recently explained, the relationship between a criminal
defendant and his counsel is not truly a traditional agency relationship.s0 In a
traditional agency relationship, the principal "has the authority to dictate the
manner in which his agent will carry out his duties."s' However, when a
criminal defendant is the principal, "the law places certain tactical decisions
solely in the hands of [his agent,] the criminal defense attorney."S2 Thus, a
defendant is "bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have
notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney" and all
decisions undertaken regarding his non-fundamental rights. 3
As I discuss below, none of these explanations adequately justifies ceding
confrontation control to counsel.
III. ANALYZING CONFRONTATION DEPRIVATIONS
An assessment of the consequences of allocating confrontation control to
counsel is best made in the context of a review of the dominant federal
jurisprudence addressing Confrontation Clause claims.54 In turn, that review is
46. Id. (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
47. Id; see also United States v. Burke, 257 F.3d 1321, 1323 (2001) ("If we add to the list of
circumstances in which a defendant can trump his counsel's decision, the adversarial system becomes less
effective as the opinions of lay persons are substituted for the judgment of legally trained counsel.").
48. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975).
49. Id. at 820-21.
50. United States v. Chapman, 593 F.3d 365, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2010).
51. Id. at 370.
52. Id.
53. New Yorkv. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114-15 (2000) (citations omitted) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R.,
370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962)). Of course, the relationship between a criminal defendant and his counsel is not
truly a traditional agency relationship. As the Fourth Circuit recently noted, "the attorney's obligations in a
criminal case do not precisely mirror the obligations of a general agent representing his principal on civil
matters." Chapman, 593 F.3d at 370. Ordinarily, a principal "has the authority to dictate the manner in which
his agent will carry out his duties." Id. In the context of a criminal defendant, "the law places certain tactical
decisions solely in the hands of the criminal defense attorney." Id.
54. There is a considerable body of state law addressing the question of confrontation control. State
supreme courts are also divided about how to allocate authority for the waiver of confrontation and about how
to monitor and enforce that allocation of authority. In general, state courts have been more willing than
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best made in comparison to how courts generally assess the constitutionality of
claims of Confrontation Clause error.55
A properly preserved confrontation claim is evaluated under the harmless
error standard. This means that a confrontation claim warrants reversal unless
the reviewing court determines, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did
not contribute to the verdict. 7 If the confrontation error is unpreserved, a court
will review the confrontation claim only for plain error.58 Thus, the likelihood
of success on a Confrontation Clause claim depends heavily upon a
contemporaneous objection that preserves the claim for harmless error review.
But courts do not apply these traditional standards of review to a defendant who
complains that his counsel's conduct deprived him of his confrontation right.o
federal courts to enforce a defendant-centered confrontation right. At least ten state supreme courts have
considered this issue; three states have adopted the federal majority view: Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169
P.3d 662, 669-70 (Colo. 2007) (en banc); Parson v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 775, 783-84 (Ky. 2004);
State v. Pasqualone, 903 N.E.2d 270, 275-76 (Ohio 2009), while six states require that the defendant
personally waive his confrontation rights in a demonstrably voluntary and intelligent relinquishment of a
known right or privilege: State v. Sainz, 924 P.2d 474, 477 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Thomas v. United States,
914 A.2d 1, 19-20 (D.C. 2006); State v. Lopez, 22 P.3d 1040, 1049 (Kan. 2001); State v. Caulfield, 722
N.W.2d 304, 310-11 (Minn. 2006); State v. Tapson, 41 P.3d 305, 310 (Mont. 2001); State v. Muse, 967
S.W.2d 764, 767-68 (Tenn. 1998). Nevertheless, state defendants who petition for habeas corpus relief are
necessarily subject to clearly established federal law about confrontation control. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538
U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003). Accordingly, I focus herein solely on federal decisions.
55. My elision of any distinction between direct review and post-conviction cases is deliberate. As other
commentators have explained, "[a]lthough the difference in procedural setting could conceivably influence a
court's analysis of the client-control issue, the courts have tended to treat the issue as basically the same
whether presented in one procedural context or another." LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 22, § 11.6(a). "Rulings
recognizing attorney or client control with respect to a particular defense decision will be carried over from
one procedural context to another." Id.
56. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684
(1986).
57. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24
(1967); see also United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 45 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that the strength of other
evidence at trial rendered confrontation error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Hinton,
423 F.3d 355, 363 (3d Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Pryor, 483 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir. 2007) (same);
United States v. Adams, 628 F.3d 407, 419-20 (7th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Holmes, 620 F.3d
836, 845 (8th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1287 (11 th Cir. 2006) (noting that
confrontation error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when elicited testimony would have been
cumulative of marginal relevance); United States v. Jackson, 636 F.3d 687, 697 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that
when government relied on tainted evidence, confrontation error was not harmless beyond reasonable doubt);
Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 792 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that when testimony in question was the
prosecution's main proof of guilt, confrontation error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); United
States v. Ward, 598 F.3d 1054, 1060 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that when considered cumulatively with due
process errors, and in light of government's circumstantial evidence of defendant's guilt, confrontation error
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
58. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 730
(1993). The plain error standard is far less favorable to the appealing defendant; the defendant-appellant bears
the burden of showing that (1) a confrontation error occurred; (2) the error was clear or obvious; and (3) the
error affected the defendant's substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-36. Even if the defendant-
appellant meets this burden, the reviewing court may only use its discretion to grant relief if the error
"seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation ofjudicial proceedings." Id. at 732-34 (quoting
United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
59. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135; Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279.
60. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988).
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Instead, a majority of courts focus their appellate inquiry on the strategic merits
of the attorney conduct that gave rise to the claim.
How do courts assess the constitutionality of the confrontation choices
made by an attorney without the defendant's consent? A minority of federal
courts of appeal have held-as I would urge-that a stipulation by counsel
validly waives a defendant's confrontation right only if the defendant
voluntarily and intentionally agrees to the waiver.6 2 In those jurisdictions, a
confrontation waiver "requires an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege." 63 Thus, the confrontation right is validly waived
only if the defendant (1) knew he had the opportunity to confront and cross-
examine the witness and (2) was on notice of the consequences if he failed to
assert the right.64
However, a majority of federal courts of appeal have held that counsel
may unilaterally waive a defendant's right to confrontation.6 5 In those majority
jurisdictions, courts refuse to even to address the substantive confrontation
deprivation. Rather than ask whether the defendant has been deprived of his
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, these courts ask whether the
defendant has been deprived of a different Sixth Amendment right: the right to
effective assistance of counsel. 6
Therefore, courts apply Strickland analysis to a defendant's complaint
about counsel's relinquishment of confrontation. However, they carve out a
narrow "Strickland-hybrid" exception for cases in which the defendant
dissented from counsel's conduct.6 7 I strongly believe that the minority view is
the correct one. Vindication of this requires an explanation and critique of
Strickland and Strickland-hybrid analysis.
A. Strickland Analysis
At its core, Strickland seeks only to identify and remedy situations in
which "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 632 F.3d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Clemmons v. Delo,
124 F.3d 944, 956 (8th Cir. 1997), and Carter v. Sowders, 5 F.3d 975, 981 (6th Cir. 1993)).
63. Carter, 5 F.3d at 981 (quoting Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1972)).
64. See id. at 981-82.
65. See Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282, 287-88 (9th Cir. 1965); see also United States v. Plitman, 194
F.3d 59,64 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that defense counsel may waive a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation).
66. See, e.g., Janosky v. St. Amand, 594 F.3d 39, 47-48 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Cooper, 243
F.3d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 2001); Plitman, 194 F.3d at 63-64; United States v. Stephens, 609 F.2d 230, 232-
33 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Goldstein, 532 F.2d 1305, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1976); accordUnited States
v. Gonzales, 342 F. App'x 446,447-48 (1Ith Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Hawkins v. Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146,
1154-56 (10th Cir. 1999).
67. See Plitman, 194 F.3d at 63-64.
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result."6 8 Strickland offers no relief to a defendant complaining of ineffective
assistance of counsel unless the defendant can show that (1) counsel's
performance was deficient and (2) the deficiency prejudiced the defendant.6 9
Courts conducting Strickland analysis need not consider both prongs of the
inquiry "if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one."70 In
particular, a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of
the alleged deficiencies." 7' This reflects the Court's efficiency concerns: "If it
is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be
followed." 72
As to the prejudice prong of the inquiry, Strickland focuses only on case
outcomes; if counsel's waiver of confrontation did not prejudice the outcome of
the case, Strickland offers no relief 73 The Strickland prejudice inquiry does not
address either the particular confrontation that the jurors were unable to observe
or the general systemic values associated with confrontation. Rather, Strickland
prejudice requires that the defendant show that "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different" as "the factfinder would have had a
reasonable doubt respecting guilt." 74 A defendant seeking to show prejudice
from counsel's waiver (or forfeiture) of the confrontation right thus faces a
heavy burden. He must explain "what he hoped to elicit during a cross-
examination of the witness, or what, if anything, the jury would gain by
listening to [the witness's] testimony [and] how the outcome of his trial would
have differed" had counsel exercised the confrontation right.
This is in marked contrast to the prejudice associated with a
Confrontation Clause claim. The Supreme Court has explicitly distinguished
the Strickland prejudice standard from the Confrontation Clause prejudice
standard. The prejudice in a Confrontation Clause violation arises when the
defendant "was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-
examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the
witness, and thereby 'to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could
appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witnesses.,, 76
This is because "[i]t would be a contradiction in terms to conclude that a
68. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
69. Id. at 687.




74. Id at 694-95.
75. Salter v. McDonough, 246 F. App'x 623, 626 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d
1206, 1219 (11 th Cir. 2001)).
76. Delaware v. Van Ardsdale, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) (alteration in original) (quoting Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)).
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defendant denied any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him
nonetheless had been afforded his right to 'confrontation' because use of that
right would not have affected the jury's verdict." 7 7
However, Strickland was not intended to enforce or vindicate individual
78
constitutional criminal procedure rights such as the right to confrontation.
Thus, the wholesale deprivation of the right to confront and cross-examine a
government witness is only relevant to a Strickland inquiry if the defendant
proves that the outcome of the trial might have been different. In sum, using
Strickland's prejudice inquiry excludes any consideration of harm that flows
from a non-outcome determinative deprivation of confrontation as a specific
procedural right or as a right of "intrinsic" value to the accused.
In applying the performance prong of Strickland to a claim that counsel
deprived the defendant of the right to confrontation, courts do not consider
whether counsel honored the ethical obligation to consult with the defendant
either about the goals of representation or about counsel's intent to waive
confrontation. "Under the Strickland standard, breach of an ethical standard
does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
assistance of counsel."79  Rather, "the focus is exclusively upon breach of
obligations that would be deemed incompetency."80 Thus, while Rule 1.2 of
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires that a lawyer "abide by
a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation," it is not per se
deficient performance to decline to ask a client whether his goal is acquittal or
his goal is forcing the government to its full burden of proof.8
Once communication with the defendant is eliminated as a possible source
of deficient performance, the only remaining performance inquiry is about the
professional competence of the attorney's conduct concerning the alleged
confrontation deprivation. Strickland performance review requires that the
court assume that counsel's conduct reflected professionally competent
strategic and tactical choices. 2
In the context of confrontation, this respect for "the role of defense
counsel in fashioning an overall trial strategy" means a presumption of
reasonableness attaches to a lawyer's strategic choices, including a "waiver of
77. Id. (alteration omitted).
78. See id at 684-87.
79. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986); see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 176
(2002) (quoting Nix).
80. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 22, § 11.6(a) n.5.
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (Approved Draft 1983); see, e.g., Allerdice v.
Schriro, No. CV-07-8049-PCT-NVW, 2008 WL 4541023, at *7 (D. Ariz. Oct. 8,2008). Allerdice, who was
represented by appointed counsel, repeatedly objected to his counsel's intent to stipulate to the testimony of
several government witnesses. Allerdice, 2008 WL 4541023, at *1. Nevertheless, the Arizona trial court
permitted counsel to enter into the stipulations. Id. at * 1-2. On habeas review, the federal court concluded that
it was "of no moment that in this case, Allerdice objected to his counsel's actions." Id. at *4. Whether
Allerdice simply wanted, as a matter of principal, to force the government to its full burden of proof was
irrelevant, so long as his counsel had been an effective trial lawyer. See id.
82. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 689 (1984).
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the right to confrontation."83  Yet an assumption that counsel waived-as
opposed to forfeited-confrontation rights may be unwarranted. For purposes
of assessing attorney performance, this is a "crucial distinction." 84
A "waiver is the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right.', 8 In contrast, a "forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of
a right."86 For example, pursuant to notice-and-demand statutes, if an attorney
does not timely demand confrontation of the forensic analyst, the trial court will
admit the forensic report and instruct the jury that the report is prima facie
proof of its contents. 87  If counsel deliberately decided to forgo cross-
examination, counsel waived the client's confrontation right. If counsel
carelessly ignored the confrontation notice or negligently failed to file a
demand, counsel forfeited the client's confrontation right.89
Under Strickland's highly deferential review of counsel's performance,
waivers are unlikely to suggest attorney performance below professional
norms.90 Forfeitures, however, are far more suggestive of deficient
performance. 9' Thus, a trial court record that clearly established a strategic
waiver as counsel's "intentional relinquishment" of a known opportunity for
confrontation would be helpful in distinguishing competent strategic choices
from incompetent omissions. Unfortunately for a defendant complaining of
counsel's confrontation conduct, trial courts generally do not require counsel to
explain why counsel did not demand confrontation; the resultant trial records
cannot distinguish between waiver and forfeiture.92 This reality of modem trial
practice-which is itself a product of the Supreme Court's categorization of
confrontation as a non-fundamental right-is one of many reasons for concern
about the application of Strickland to counsel-related confrontation claims: it is
extremely difficult for a defendant to prove that counsel's relinquishment of the
confrontation right constituted deficient attorney performance.
83. United States v. Plitman, 194 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 1999).
84. Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149, 158 (5th Cir. 1992).
85. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938)). Ironically, in the Melendez-Diaz opinion, the Supreme Court used the terms "waive[r]" and
"forfeit[ure]" as if they were synonymous. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 326 (2009);
see also State v. O'Cain, 279 P.3d 926, 932 n.5 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing the Melendez-Diaz
Court's use of waiver and forfeiture).
86. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733.
87. Metzger, supra note 19, at 482.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 487, for further discussion of the problem with treating non-demand cases as waivers,
rather than as forfeitures.
90. Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 743 (2011).
91. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149, 158 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Whether counsel's omission served
a strategic purpose is a pivotal point in Strickland and its progeny.").
92. See Metzger, supra note 19, at 517. In contrast, many attorney confrontation waivers are, by their
nature, presented and preserved in a way that demonstrates their true character as waivers. For example,
when defense counsel stipulates to testimonial evidence or forgoes cross-examination of a witness, the
resulting trial record clearly indicates that the attorney waived-rather than forfeited-the confrontation right.
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Ultimately, Strickland analysis is simply an inadequate tool by which to
evaluate claims that counsel deprived a defendant of his confrontation rights.
Strickland seeks only to identify and remedy situations in which "counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."" In Strickland
analysis, courts do not consider whether the defendant consented to-or even
knew about-counsel's waiver of constitutional rights.94 After all, Strickland
was not intended to enforce or vindicate individual constitutional criminal
procedure rights.95 Strickland's prejudice inquiry focuses only on case
outcomes; if counsel's waiver of confrontation did not prejudice the outcome of
the case, Strickland offers no relief.96
Of course, a defendant claiming violation of his right to confrontation is
not complaining about the fairness of the trial; he is complaining about the
deprivation of a specific procedural right that grants him a specific, human
moment-the opportunity to face his accusers. In this regard, confrontation is
not only a guarantee that reliability assessments will be made in a particular
procedural way but also a guarantee that the defendant will experience the
deeply personal aspects of that procedure.97
Consider Justice Scalia's anguished parent. Surely, if counsel stipulates to
the testimony of the accusing child, the trial may still have a reliable outcome.
Indeed, because a testifying child might unduly sway the jury to sympathy for
the alleged victim, stipulation might make the trial fairer. Yet there remains
"something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation
between accused and accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a criminal
prosecution.'" 98 But fairness is not the motivation that drives the anguished
parent. A rule that focuses only on the outcome cannot remedy the dignitary
harms experienced by a parent who cannot pose that awful question.
Strickland's analysis is simply inapposite to a claim of rights deprivation.99
After all, a defendant may have a fair trial and a competent trial attorney yet
still have been deprived of the opportunity to exercise his constitutional right to
confrontation.o100
B. Strickland-Hybrid Analysis
Notwithstanding their general rule applying Strickland to these types of
claims, the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of
93. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
94. See id at 696.
95. See id. at 684-87.
96. See id
97. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 290 (2004).
98. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)).
99. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. See Solum, supra note 97, at 262 (connecting "the independent value of process with the dignity of
those who are affected by legal proceedings").
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Appeal apply a modified Strickland analysis to cases in which a defendant
dissented from counsel's confrontation decision. This hybrid standard retains
Strickland's performance inquiry (described above) but replaces Strickland's
prejudice inquiry with an inquiry about whether the defendant "dissented" from
counsel's decision. 101
This "dissent" prong of the Strickland-hybrid test serves as a screening
mechanism that makes relief available to an extraordinarily narrow group of
defendants. 10 2 It is only available to a defendant who knew about the loss of
confrontation at or before the time it occurred and preserved his dissent to
counsel's conduct.'03
Yet, the fundamental rights doctrine means that counsel need not even
noti fy a defendant of a confrontation waiver. True, when an attorney stipulates
to testimony or waives cross-examination of a testifying witness, the defendant,
by virtue of his presence at trial, may have some minimal notice of the fact of
waiver, if not of its constitutional significance.10 However, when an attorney's
silence or extra-judicial conduct results in the non-exercise of confrontation,
there is no guarantee that the defendant will ever learn of the lost confrontation
opportunity. 0 5
The Ninth Circuit's characterization of this problem is poignant.
Day after day in the courts of the United States defense counsel make the
decision not to cross-examine without first informing their clients that they
have a fundamental constitutional right to insist upon cross-examination and
without obtaining from their clients a formal written waiver of this
constitutional right. How does a poor, uneducated, non-television-watching
101. See, e.g., United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1169 (10th Cir. 2005). Although the Tenth Circuit
used a Strickland-hybrid analysis, when a defendant does not dissent from counsel's conduct, "counsel's
stipulation to admission of evidence effectively waives the defendant's confrontation rights unless the
defendant can show that the waiver constituted ineffective assistance of counsel." Id.; see also Yu Tian Li v.
United States, 648 F.3d 524, 530 (7th Cir. 2011) (conducting Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel
analysis about counsel's waiver of confrontation despite fact-extensive, district court colloquy with the
defendant, who did not object to waiver, and despite the Seventh Circuit's endorsement of the Strickland-
hybrid analysis).
102. See United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 759 (9th Cir. 1989). Presumably, a contemporaneous
or nearly contemporaneous letter or motion would also adequately demonstrate a defendant's dissent. See id.
103. See id.; see, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 731 (10th Cir. 2010) (rejecting
defendant's ineffective assistance claim in part because there was no indication that the defendant "dissented
from his attorney's decision"). Moreover, even active dissent at the trial level will not protect a state defendant
seeking federal habeas relief because there is no clearly established federal rule supporting the Strickland-
hybrid doctrine. See, e.g., Allerdice v. Schriro, No. CV-07-8049-PCT-NVW, 2008 WL 4541023, at *7 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 8, 2008).
104. The cases of defendants who are tried in absentia present a wholly different confrontation analysis.
105. See Martinez, 883 F.2d at 759 (noting that there is no requirement to notify the defendant that he is
waiving his right of confrontation), vacated on other grounds, 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991). Similarly, when
the prosecution offers testimonial hearsay and counsel fails to interpose a Confrontation Clause objection,
there is no record demonstrating whether this was a counsel's tactical choice or a substantive omission.
96 [Vol. 45:83
CONFRONTATION CONTROL
defendant know that he has a fundamental constitutional right that he is
waiving when his lawyer declines to cross-examine? 0 6
The Ninth Circuit's answer is appallingly glib: "We assume, not
unreasonably in our culture, that this right is so generally known that it is not
necessary to inform the defendant of its existence." 0 7 A criminal defendant
should be presumed to have absorbed an understanding of his right to
confrontation through a sort of cultural osmosis, even if that defendant lacks
both formal education and the pseudo-legal guidance of Court TV or CSI.'o
And, only a bold and vocal defendant is likely to address the court and dissent
from his attorney's actions, thereby preserving a viable record of dissent.
Those who remain silent will not receive appellate review under the Strickland-
hybrid analysis.
Thus, the Strickland-hybrid rule gives preferential status to those lucky
defendants who understood their right to confrontation and preserved their
dissent to counsel's confrontation forfeiture or waiver. 109 Yet, there is no
principled justification for singling those defendants out for favorable appellate
review. Why should the viability of a defendant's claim be determined by the
fortuity of transparent attorney conduct or by the happenstance of a court
allowing the defendant to speak? All defendants who suffer confrontation
losses through counsel's conduct suffer the same rights deprivation and the
same dignitary harm. But only the most vulnerable defendants-those who are
ignorant of their confrontation loss-are subjected to the unforgiving Strickland
rule.
On a deeper level, though, the Strickland-hybrid approach is also
suggestive of a general unease about ceding all confrontation rights to counsel.
After all, if one truly believes that confrontation is a non-fundamental right, one
should embrace, wholeheartedly, counsel's unilateral power to stipulate to
evidence, forgo cross-examination, withhold a valid confrontation objection,
and authorize, by inaction, the introduction of testimonial forensic reports,
regardless of a defendant's dissent. Strickland-hybrid implies that, as a
principal, a defendant can direct his attorney-agent's conduct regarding
confrontation. This, in turn, suggests reliance upon a true agency theory, rather
than the modified agency theory of the Supreme Court's fundamental rights




109. See id (noting that there is no requirement to notify the defendant that he is waiving his right of
confrontation).
110. See discussion supra note 50 (discussing United States v. Chapman, 593 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 2010));
see also Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 254 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that a
defendant's objection to his attorney's tactical decisions may "revok[e] the agency with respect to the action
in question").
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unwise, or unreasonable-automatically invalidate an attorney's strategic
waiver?
Full extension of this logic should require relief for a defendant who was
unaware either of his power to dissent or of the conduct about which he might
have dissented. Instead, Strickland-hybrid analysis defers to a defendant's
active dissent while simultaneously condoning a system that allows a defendant
to languish in utter ignorance about existence of the very right as to which his
dissent would be respected."' Only a deft judicial sleight of hand could equate
an ignorant "non-dissent" with affirmative consent and thereby justify
relegating a silent, non-dissenting defendant to the Strickland wasteland.
IV. CRITIQUING THE CONTROL CONFRONTATION RULE
Application of Strickland and Strickland-hybrid analysis to defendant
claims about attorney confrontation waiver is an unfortunate byproduct of
characterizing confrontation as a non-fundamental right that is exercised or lost
at counsel's discretion. And this fundamental-right-divide remains deeply
unpersuasive to many judges and scholars.1 2 Among others, Justice Scalia has
disapproved of the "tactical-vs.-fundamental approach," as a concept that "is
vague and derives from nothing more substantial than [the] Court's say-so."'13
He stated,
What makes a right tactical? Depending on the circumstances, waiving any
right can be a tactical decision....
Whether a right is "fundamental" is equally mysterious. One would think
that any right guaranteed by the Constitution would be fundamental. But I
doubt many think that the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses
cannot be waived by counsel. Perhaps, then, specification in the Constitution
is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for "fundamental" status. But if
something more is necessary, I cannot imagine what it might be. Apart from
[a] constitutional guarantee, I know of no objective criterion for ranking
rights.1 14
Perhaps as a result of the weaknesses of this doctrine, the Supreme Court
and the federal courts of appeal increasingly sought other doctrinal
justifications for giving counsel control over non-fundamental constitutional
rights. The emerging trend seems to be an increased reliance upon a
bastardized agency theory that rests, in turn, upon a claim that representation by
111. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
112. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 22, § 11.6(a)-(b), for a critique of the fundamental/non-fundamental
rights divide as confusing and unclear.
113. Gonzalez, 553 U.S. at 2564 (Scalia, J., concurring).
114. Id (citation omitted).
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counsel is a broad implicit waiver in which a defendant, as principal, cedes all
tactical and strategic decisions to his attorney-agent.115
Justice Scalia's recent dicta in Gonzalez offers an alarming glimpse at the
potential consequences of this reasoning:
I would ... adopt the rule that, as a constitutional matter, all waivable rights
(except, of course, the right to counsel) can be waived by counsel. There is
no basis in the Constitution, or as far as I am aware in common-law practice,
for distinguishing in this regard between a criminal defendant and his
authorized representative. In fact, the very notion ofrepresentative litigation
suggests that the Constitution draws no distinction between them. "A
prisoner ... who defends by counsel, and silently acquiesces in what they
agree to, is bound as any other principal by the act of his agent.""16
This idea might make sense if defendants were advised that the price of
representation by counsel was the relinquishment of control over decisions such
as confrontation; however, there is no such Boykin-like allocution or formal in-
court waiver during which criminal defendants knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waive their right to control confrontation choices in exchange for
representation by counsel.117 Absent such a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver, how can representation by counsel-in and of itself-constitute a
comprehensive waiver of all non-fundamental constitutional rights? In the
absence of any explicit waiver, this theory is the most extreme form ofjudicial
wishful thinking. A silent waiver doctrine is inconsistent with our most basic
rules of constitutional criminal procedure. It is a dangerous trend and one that
we should vigorously oppose.
At a Symposium like this-devoted to the Sixth Amendment rights of
confrontation and counsel-we might ask other questions as well. For
example: What would be so bad about letting lawyers do what lawyers do-
zealously represent criminal defendants by making strategic and tactical
decisions using the professional expertise that first justified the Gideon rule?'18
First, basic systemic concerns of efficiency and finality favor a clear
resolution of this issue in favor of a defendant's control over confrontation.
The absence of procedural prerequisites to a valid waiver of confrontation
produces unnecessary uncertainty in trial and appellate litigations. The
"anything-the-attorney-says-goes" approach gains small efficiencies by not
115. Seeid at 254-58.
116. Id. at 257 (second alteration in original) (quoting People v. Rathbun, 21 Wend. 509, 543 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1839)).
117. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-45 (1969).
118. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) ("Even the intelligent and educated layman has
small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence.... He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he [may]
have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."
(quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932))).
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requiring trial courts to conduct a brief confrontation inquiry but imposes a
larger cost by the unnecessary increase in appellate and post-conviction
litigation.'
But these inefficiencies could be as easily resolved by adopting Justice
Scalia's position in Gonzalez and allowing an attorney to waive all rights other
than the right to counsel.120 So there must be a deeper, more compelling reason
to prefer defendant autonomy over attorney authority.
The answer, I believe, lies in the text of the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth
Amendment grants the accused the right to "confront and cross-examine" the
witness against him.121 How can counsel or court take that right from the
accused? After all,
the counsel clause . . . say[s] that counsel's job is to "assist[]" the accused in
making "his"-the accused's--defense, and it is hard to see how the accused
would still own his defense if some government-imposed agent took it over
against his will; the assistant would be usurping the place of the master.122
Another theory justifying delegation of confrontation control to counsel
offers counsel's competence as an adequate remedy for the deprivation of
defendant autonomy over deeply personal rights like confrontation.123 It may
be true that attorney control will produce "better" outcomes and more efficient
trials.124 However, nothing about our right to counsel doctrine has ever
characterized representation by counsel as a quid pro quo in which the courts
provide an accused with counsel and, in exchange, the accused cedes most of
his rights to his lawyer in order to improve the efficiency and accuracy of the
court system.
Moreover, in a constitutional system that values confrontation for its own
sake-above and beyond its value in producing reliable trial outcomes-a fair
or reliable trial outcome does not satisfy the confrontation right. In Justice
Scalia's own words, "Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is
obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes." 25
The "language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment" focuses not only on
procedural mechanisms designed to promote reliable trial outcomes but also on
procedures that reaffirm defendants' rights to make deeply personal choices.12 6
119. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151-52 (2006).
120. See id.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
122. AKHEIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 114 (1998) (third
alteration in original).
123. See discussion infra Part II.A.
124. But see Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right ofSelf-Representation: An Empirical Look at the
Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423 (2007).
125. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,62 (2004).
126. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975); accord Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983);
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965).
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It is the individual defendant's deeply personal interest in the conduct of the
trial that justifies both the Faretta entitlement to self-representation and the
Boykin requirement that the defendant be personally aware of the rights he is
waiving. 127 Just as forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant "strips" the
"right to make a defense .. . of the personal character upon which the
Amendment insists," so too does forcing a defendant to accept counsel's
choices about confrontation strip away the personal opportunity to confront
one's accusers. 12 8
Our criminal procedure system soundly "reject[s] an approach to
individual liberties that 'abstracts from the right to its purposes, and then
eliminates the right."' 1 29 Confrontation is a mandated entitlement that
guarantees a defendant a particular mode of proceeding that protects both a
systemic interest in reliability and the defendant's deeply personal interests in
accusatory fairness. 13 0
Thus, we should worry that the combined effect of jurisprudential
uncertainty and prioritization of attorney choices will unduly reduce the amount
of confrontation in our trial courts. Delegation of confrontation choices to
counsel surely produces less confrontation than defendants might otherwise
demand. Less confrontation means fewer exercises of a procedural right that is
an essential part of the architecture of adversarial criminal trials. The result is
an ever-increasing series of trials that look, more and more, like the inquisitorial
system of trial-by-affidavit, which Crawford sought to avoid.131
Already, the overwhelming majority of criminal cases are resolved by
plea bargains. Permitting professional players to negotiate around the
Confrontation Clause suppresses the vigorous exercise of a procedural right that
is an essential part of the architecture of criminal trials. Notwithstanding the
Crawford revolution, increasing numbers of testimonial witnesses still provide
evidence that is unconfronted and unexamined. As to whole categories of
witnesses-chief among them forensic witnesses-the systemic norm remains
the presentation of evidence by ex parte affidavit. This indirect unraveling of
Crawford cannot be justified by the fig leaf of counsel's consent or waiver.
V. CONCLUSION
The Confrontation Clause reflects important dignitary values "deep in
human nature that regard[] face-to-face confrontation between accused and
127. See Faretta, 422 U.S. 806; see also New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114-15 (2000).
128. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)); see also
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988) (applying the ineffective assistance of counsel standard to
counsel's waiver of the right to call defense witnesses right to compulsory process is not a fundamental right).
129. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 185 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145 (2006)).
130. See Massaro, supra note 13, at 897.
131. See id.
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accuser 'as essential to a fair trial."" 3 2 "This right is rooted in human nature, in
ancient and long-standing legal practice."' 33 Only by embracing a defendant's
control of the confrontation right can our system of constitutional criminal
procedure guarantee the preservation of that right.
132. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)).
133. United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated, 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir.
1991) (citing Coy, 487 U.S. 1012).
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